The actual record until the monthly income of 1 million yen is achieved with SaaS is like this
Instead of selling software licenses, 'SaaS' provided to users via the Internet often takes the form of monthly or annual billing. When an individual developer provides a service with SaaS, it is not only necessary to develop the service from scratch, but it is also necessary to conduct unfamiliar marketing activities. It's a tough one.
Here's How I Bootstrapped a SaaS to 10k MRR - Bannerbear
https://www.bannerbear.com/journey-to-10k-mrr/
Below is a graph until Bannerbear achieves MRR 1 million yen. The vertical axis is the amount of MRR, and the horizontal axis is the date, starting on August 31, 2019. From the left, the arrows indicate the launch of Bannerbear, re-launch, two business conversions, new feature announcements, price changes, and positioning . I know what you did.
Prior to that, it seems that from January 2019 to July 31, there was no income at all.
At that time, Mr. Yongfook challenged to establish 12 startups in 12 months after quitting the company he worked for, and was defeated spectacularly. However, thanks to this challenge, the technology field that I am interested in became clear. In the challenge, Mr. Yongfook has consistently succeeded in launching startups because he used the technology he knew well, rather than reaching out for new technology. Although it is a failure as monetization, Yongfook says, 'It was a good practice.'
Yongfook, who failed to launch multiple startups, will start focusing on the field of 'image generation', which he is most interested in, from September 2019. The graph from September 1st to December 31st is as follows, and in December it reached MRR 400 dollars (about 41,800 yen).
At this time, a tool called 'Previewmojo' developed by Yongfook was to generate images for
After that, Mr. Yongfook thought that ``the market targeted by the product is too small,'' and implemented a marketing strategy of changing the brand name to ``Bannerbear'' without changing the app itself. Although this strategy was successful and traffic increased due to interest from new users, it did not directly affect revenue. Yongfook wrote that the method of targeting a niche market is sometimes effective, but if it is too niche, it is necessary to expand the market.
Until March 2020, Yongfook was selling on the Shopify app store, but withdrew after judging that there was no traction. We narrowed Bannerbear down to one API service and launched a new template editor and REST API. This seems to have created many new use cases for new target groups.
Looking at the graph, you can see that the earnings have started to grow constantly from around April 2020.
Over the next six months, Yongfook devoted 50% of his time to coding and the remaining 50% to marketing. Specifically, after coding for a week, he repeated the act of tweeting and blogging for the next week.
Here's an example, if you write an article like 'How to Get Your First 25 SaaS Customers' on Bannerbear's website...
How to Get Your First 25 SaaS Customers - Bannerbear
https://www.bannerbear.com/blog/how-to-get-your-first-25-saas-customers/
I also posted an article on a posting site called Indie Hackers called 'Have I entered the Long Slow SaaS Ramp of Death?' Yongfook says that the more articles he wrote, the more SaaS conversions he had.
Have I entered the Long Slow SaaS Ramp of Death?
https://www.indiehackers.com/post/have-i-entered-the-long-slow-saas-ramp-of-death-6a8db1892d
And from November 2020, based on the job theory , we recognize that the needs required of Bannerbear are ``automation of marketing'' and ``expansion of marketing''. It's intended for two types of users: those who set up a lot of automation with Zapier , and those who use the API to integrate a ton of tools.
As a result, Bannerbear was able to achieve MRR of approximately 1 million yen in January 2021.
Related Posts:
in Note, Posted by darkhorse_log