Nov 17, 2024 21:00:00

Why is the quality of Japanese software so poor?

While Japan is home to many of the world's leading hardware manufacturers, such as Sony, Casio, and Panasonic, the country relies heavily on overseas products for its software, and the poor quality of Japanese software has been criticized. Podcaster Tim Romero explains why.

The forgotten mistake that killed Japan's software industry - Disrupting Japan

https://www.disruptingjapan.com/the-forgotten-mistake-that-killed-japans-software-industry/

The reason for the low quality of Japanese software is said to be

the zaibatsu that emerged during the Meiji period. Zaibatsu, which are large corporate groups or family-run corporate groups, had strong influence over the government of the time and drove the economy with the full support of the government. At the end of the 19th century, four major zaibatsu, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui, and Yasuda, were born, and each zaibatsu came to own its own banks, mining and chemical companies, heavy industry companies, etc., and gained great political and military power.

These zaibatsu later came to wield great influence, controlling more than 50% of the Japanese economy during World War II, but following Japan's defeat, the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ) deemed these zaibatsu to be 'a serious economic and political risk to the free and democratic development of Japan' and either dissolved them or carried out large-scale restructuring.

However, as the Cold War intensified and in response to petitions from former zaibatsu employees, the old zaibatsu were restructured into ' inter-company organizations ' made up of inter-company organizations such as presidents' associations, business partner organizations, and public relations committees. Subsequently, with the inter-company organizations with their affiliated banks, trading companies, factories, etc. at their core, Japan achieved rapid economic growth and a miraculous recovery from its defeat in World War II.

Regarding Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, Romero commented, 'Japan's economy was not as developed as it is today, and in order to survive, it had to look overseas, compete globally, and innovate to make the best products in the world through long-term investments.' However, by the 1980s, Japan had grown into one of the world's leading economic powers, and economists at the time predicted that 'within 10 years, Japan's

gross national product (GNP) would be larger than that of the United States.'

In this situation, many inter-company organizations adopted the strategy of 'focusing on markets where it is easier to make money, rather than making high-risk, expensive investments in uncertain and emerging global companies.' When computers became commercially available in the late 1980s, technology companies affiliated with the organization made a lot of money by selling PCs and software to corporations within the same group. As a result, competition between companies and with overseas products disappeared, and large overseas system integration companies rose to prominence. Japan lost the opportunity to develop a world-class PC software industry.

Furthermore, in Japan's software development scene, a method has been adopted in which functions are implemented after receiving a customer request and signing a contract. However, Romero points out that this 'not only caused Japan to fall behind the global software industry, but also marked the beginning of the collapse of innovation in the Japanese industry as a whole.'

Another reason for the stagnation of Japan's software industry is that many Japanese companies at the time did not value software engineers. In the 1980s and 1990s, software development was considered a low-skill job, and although there were many software engineers who were passionate about 'doing new things with computers,' 'how technology can have a major impact on other industries,' and 'creating software that delights users,' they were undervalued in terms of promotion and other aspects.

On the other hand, hardware engineers were highly regarded, and many innovative products such as the Walkman and Family Computer were released in the 1980s and 1990s, achieving worldwide success. However, even during this time, many overseas companies were working on developing software that would run on standard hardware platforms, rather than software that ran on dedicated hardware.

During the subsequent IT bubble, Japanese companies sought out talented software engineers, but as a result of this disregard for software engineers, there was no software industry in the market that actually valued software engineers, nor was there any know-how to find them. It has also been pointed out that as a result of the lack of companies that valued software engineers, students who wanted to become software engineers were viewed as eccentrics.

In Japan, as the saying goes, 'the nail that sticks out gets hammered down,' so being overly conspicuous is something to be avoided. Furthermore, it has been

criticized that the emphasis on 'looking busy and working hard' rather than on the results one leaves behind resulted in a failure to produce high-quality software.

When the bubble burst in the 1990s, the power of many inter-company organizations weakened, and some affiliated banks and other institutions went bankrupt or merged. The term ' lost decade ' was coined to symbolize Japan after the bubble burst. However, along with this, many companies implemented many reforms, such as ending the lifetime employment system and moving production bases overseas. Although economic growth certainly slowed, the foundation for future startup innovation was laid during this period.

Since then, the development of cloud computing and the rise of Silicon Valley have improved the image of software engineers, and many talented programmers have been born. With the safety net of lifetime employment and guaranteed promotion gone, some workers have chosen to work as 'freelancers,' forming the core of Japan's flexible startup workforce, and some companies are rethinking their business models accordingly.

Regarding the future of Japan, Romero said, 'Just as the zaibatsu developed Japan's economy continuing into the Edo period, and inter-company organizations developed Japan's economy after the war, something will be born from a new combination of startups, corporations, and education that will create Japan's next economic growth.'